题目：  总额控制结合按病种分值付费制度对医院的再分配效应

            Distributional Consequences of Diagnosis-based Payment Scheme with a Global Budget

主讲：  易君健（香港中文大学）

时间：  6月16日（周三）10:00-11:30

方式：  腾讯会议

链接：  https://meeting.tencent.com/s/yapFaH8y3U89

会议 ID：503 327 013

会议密码：12321

This paper examines the distributional consequences of the diagnosis-based payment scheme with a global budget for hospitals. We explore a payment reform in the urban employee basic medical insurance system in China in 2016. In response to the payment reform from fee-for-service to diagnosis-based payment scheme with a global budget, hospitals raise revenue through multiple channels: Hospitals upcode admission cases within each diagnostic category, increase the shares of patients in categories with higher upcoding potential, and increase the total number of admissions. Under the global budget cap, hospitals’ heterogenous responses to the payment reform lead to increasing disparity in hospital payments and hospital revenue. Our decomposition analysis suggests that such increasing disparity is mainly driven by the heterogeneous upcoding behaviors across hospitals. Hospitals that are more experienced in diagnostic categories with higher upcoding potential, larger in size, and more exposed to the reform upcode cases more aggressively.

易君健，男，1978年出生于湖南省湘乡市。2011年获得香港中文大学博士学位。2011年至2014年赴美国芝加哥大学经济系从事博士后研究，师从James Heckman（2000年诺贝尔经济学奖得主）和Gary Becker（1992年诺贝尔经济学奖得主）。2014年至2020年担任新加坡国立大学经济系助理教授。2021年至今担任香港中文大学经济系副教授。目前的研究兴趣主要集中于医疗与健康经济学、医疗与健康大数据分析、人工智能经济学、人力资本理论、劳动和人口经济学、发展经济学、计量经济学和行为经济学，先后在经济学、管理学、公共卫生与人口学等领域内的国际顶级学术期刊发表科研论文，包括Demography, Management Science, Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Journal, International Economic Review, The Lancet, Journal of Labor Economics, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Development Economics等。